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When do Agricultural Exports Help the Rural Poor? A Political-     1Nelson and Winter (1982) have drawn our attention to how




Few issues are more guaranteed to generate a dispute among
social scientists than the impact of the growth of agricultural
exports on the welfare of the rural, often poor, worker or peasant
in developing countries. The wide range of views reflects the
excessively narrow models sometimes used to think through the
issue. Only when a solidly political economy perspective is adopted
does one have much chance of reaching a defensible judgment on the
relative frequency of good vs bad outcomes, on which conditions
make the difference between the former and the latter, and on
whether at this point in time the "good" outcomes are likely to
prevail.
Within each general perspective on the issue there are of
course more and less persuasive points of view. From the economics
side an example of the less defensible would be the idea that as
long as exports are undertaken freely the activity must raise the
incomes of the participants, among whom some will generally be
poor. From the political side its counterpart might be the idea
that developing countries are always so successfully exploited by
the industrial countries that international trade, being just
another manifestation of that exploitation, cannot generally help
the developing country or the poorer people in it. Such
perspectives are based on theory which is both too general and too
loose to warrant much credence, the looseness relating
substantially to the failure to take a close and careful look at
the relevant empirical evidence.
2. The Basic Arguments on the Economic Side
Mainstream Western economics seldom incorporates the use of
political power in its models of economic activity. And it tends to
be "static" in the sense of focussing on the impact of one-shot
changes in independent variables (e.g. relative prices, the
composition of output between exports and non-exports, etc.) on the
equilibrium levels of dependent variables when enough time has
passed for a new equilibrium to be reached. One reason for the
latter proclivity is that static analysis is much simpler than is
understanding the dynamic growth process whereby savings,
investment and technological change contribute to growth of the
economy.1
There are three main lines of argument which singly and
together suggest that trade in agricultural commodities should be3
beneficial to the rural poor (and to the poor as a whole). They
focus mainly on the export part of that trade, which in the typical
developing country has been more important than the import
component. The first two points are static; they involve the
question of how trade would affect the incomes of various groups by
leading to a reallocation of resources among products and by
increasing the country's specialization in a smaller number of
items. The simplest trade theory indicates that in the typical case
a country's income will rise when a country shifts away from
autarky and towards freer trade (e.g. by removing some impediments
to trade); although some groups may lose, their losses will be less
than the gains of the winners. It further predicts that low-wage
countries will export disproportionately those items which are
intensive in the use of labour, and that this will lead to an
increase in their wage rates and hence a reduction in poverty
(Krueger, 1988; others). This argument is not sector specific; it
implies that labour intensive agricultural items like flowers would
be exported, as would labour intensive manufactured goods like
clothing. The argument holds for countries which are more labour
abundant than their trading partners; in a world with a wide range
of wages, it applies most clearly to the lowest wage countries,
while the situation of those in the middle of the wage hierarchy is
ambiguous.
The second argument of particular merit is that developing
countries often have a comparative advantage in agricultural
products, one which is often suppressed by tariffs in support of
import substituting industrialization policies, or by export taxes
whose main logic may be to raise public sector revenues. When such
trade is suppressed, agriculture suffers and with it those who
supply factors of production to that sector. Releasing the shackles
on agricultural exports should raise the incomes of poor rural
workers (Schiff and Valdes, 1992; etc.). Since rural incomes tend
to be lower than urban ones (in part because of lower skills and in
part because the transfer of workers from rural to urban areas
requires an earnings differential in favour of the latter) a given
increase in the demand for labour in rural areas is likely to have
a greater poverty alleviating effect than were it to occur in urban
areas. Non-labour income accrues to many people in agriculture
(even if for most of them the amount is low), so the distribution
of land used in the production of exportables and importables is
also important to the distributional impact of trade. Where the
export crops are not intensive in labour but in land (or a
particular category of land) and/or other natural resources like
water, and where ownership of that resource is unequal, the poor
could lose whereas in the opposite case they should gain
(Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1989). Thus it is generally believed
that coffee exports from Colombia or Costa Rica, in both of which
small coffee farms have played a significant role) would be more
beneficial to the peasants and rural workers than such exports from4
Brazil, where most of the farms are large. And smallholder tea
production in Kenya or cocoa production in Ghana and Nigeria have
been heralded as the most desirable type of agricultural exports.
Glover (1984), Tiffen (1995) and others have pointed to the fact
that small farm links with and subcontracting to large
intermediaries may be a strong recipe for benefits. Though this
facet of agriculture means that no general outcome could be
expected to hold across a wide variety of countries, it leaves
optimism whenever exportables are reasonably labour intensive.
The third strand in the "agricultural trade as poverty
alleviator" line of thinking is dynamic, and is based on the
general belief that free or relatively free trade promotes faster
overall growth, i.e. not only does a higher level of trade raise
incomes on a one-shot basis, but it also puts the economy on a
faster growth path. Some authors have argued that freer trade
raises savings, while others opine that it leads to faster
productivity growth by speeding the transfer of technology, often
through the MNCs but also through other means (Pack, 1992) .If this
is the case, then even in a country where the static effects on the
poor turned out to be negative (e.g. because the exportables were
very capital intensive) and the short-run effect was therefore to
increase poverty, in the longer run this effect would be reversed
by the faster growth achieved. 
To assess the persuasiveness of this set of arguments one must
consider the various theoretical counter-arguments; even more
important, one must take a look at the empirical evidence. On the
former count, there are several points of significance which cloud
the issue but leave open the possibility that in the typical case
the optimistic expectation is valid. At this point it is important
to distinguish among variants of the positive view. In particular,
it may be applied to a single country or sector or more broadly
across agriculture as a whole and for the developing world as a
whole. And it may be refer to the poverty impact of current levels
of the exports or to increases in those levels. It is more likely
to be valid the narrower the range of its application. Clearly
agricultural products which are quite labour intensive and are
produced by small-holders in a small country should have a
beneficial impact on poverty in that country. Those which have high
income and price elasticity will have the additional advantage that
an increase in exports, through expansion of production either in
the same or additional countries, will increase the total benefits
to producers of such items. When the share of income generated
which goes to the poor is too low, because the item is not very
labour intensive and the associated land rents do not go to the
poor, then its impact is not likely to be positive. And when demand
elasticities are low, expansion of production will not be
beneficial to the whole set of producers even if production is
labour intensive. Since both price and income elasticities of
demand are low for many or most agricultural products, it is not     2 Maizels (1994, p.1686) notes that "the decline in real
commodity prices since the early 1980s.....has been so sharp as
to constitute a phenomenon not seen since the Great Depression of
the 1930s." The 1990 level was 45% below that of 1980 and 10%
below the 1930s low reached in 1932.
     3 Scitovsky (1985) emphasizes the high share of the benefits
form t rade which often go not to the producer or the consumer
but to the intermediary. Asymmetric information is of special
value in the financial world; the Rothschild empire benefitted
from quick distribution of privileged information among its
branches in the different European countries through the use of
homing pigeons. Monopolists often suppress information with
positive social potential when its spread would lower their own
profits. Industrial spies and like operatives attest to the
private value of information and the desire of its holder to keep
control.
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surprising that there is a good deal of pessimism among economists
as to the potential benefits of agricultural exports to the third
world as a whole (Maizels, 1994).2 Any such pessimism is a matter
of degree, however, since even if the income elasticity of demand
is relatively low, as long as it is not negative there will be
space for a gradual increase in exports without their price
falling. Thus the key question is the potential rate of growth of
earnings from such exports. Those whose pessimism was based on a
low elasticity of demand (e.g. Prebisch, 1950 and Singer, 1950)
have contributed importantly to the underlying logic of import
substituting industrialization.
At a technical level it has been increasingly recognized that
participants in international trade tend disproportionately to be
large firms. Since such firms tend also to be more capital
intensive than their smaller counterparts, this combination creates
the possibility that increasing trade will not raise wages relative
to the returns to capital in any country, not even the labour
abundant ones. Thus if Brazil's exports of orange juice come from
large plantations, then the effect on the wage bill is likely to be
limited. Similarly it is recognized that international trade can
cause losses due to lack of information on the part of, say, buyers
of certain goods in less developed countries when their information
is inadequate. Information has always been valuable in the
distribution of the rents associated with trade and exports, and
has intertwined with monopoly positions in such a way as to
generate high rents.3 
The fact that profits are often high in export activities (the
most extreme being the vent for surplus situation-see Myint, 1958),
means that the distribution of those rents is likely to affect the     4 A commonly asked question at this time whether Chile,
whose agricultural exports have boomed over the last couple of
decades, will be able to move smoothly on from the simple stage
of export-led growth to the phase where value added is greater.
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welfare of may people. Trade affects the citizens of a country also
through imports. Where the rural poor produce importables they can
lose from freer trade. When the exchange rate fluctuates so that
there are bursts of imports, such producers may suffer serious
losses (which may even sink them) despite having a longer run or
basic capacity to compete; countries which run balance of payments
deficits (because of capital inflows or with a view to curtailing
inflation) can wipe out or injure poor producers who are in fact
acceptably productive. The overvaluation of the Mexican peso,
together with the freeing of trade, has had disastrous effects on
the small corn producers in that country, contributing to the
Zapatista uprising.
There has also been a counter view to the idea that relatively
free trade provides dynamic benefits to the poor, partly on the
grounds that its growth benefits in general may be modest, and
partly on the grounds that it may have a distribution-worsening
effect, if for example it leads to the introduction of quite labour
saving technology. Losses can result from the instability of the
international markets, especially for primary commodities whose
prices tend to fluctuate a lot. And they can result from a
country's getting into a rut (e,.g. specialization in some primary
product with falling price) from which it tends not to emerge--this
classic dynamic argument has been returning to favour slowly after
an implausibly long period during which static theory tended to
dominate ideas in economics.4 Whereas the data on demand
elasticities in world markets are relatively easy to estimate, the
theoretical understanding of the impact of higher levels of trade
on poverty (rural or overall) through these sorts of dynamic
effects is weak so its overall contribution can only be sorted out
through analysis of the empirical record.
3. Arguments with Roots in Politics and Power 
Political economists think more consciously and directly in
terms of models of power and how it is wielded, and accordingly are
somewhat less inclined than economists to the view that trade is
likely to be of clear net benefit to developing countries. Writers
in the Marxist stream (Lenin, 1966; Frank, 1969) and later those of
the dependency school in Latin America (Sunkel, 1969, 1973) and
elsewhere argued that international economic interaction between
the centre countries and those on the periphery was both designed
and destined to benefit the former at the expense of the latter--an
argument most obvious under conditions of colonialism but having     5 While there may be some truth to it under certain
conditions, this argument in its extreme form is not plausible.
     6 A high level of trade is likely to increase certain types
of risks (e.g. those related with sharp changes in the price of
tradables), though it can reduce others. It tends also to shift
life styles in the direction of internationally dominant ones, a
sociological effect on which some authors put a great deal of
weight (e.g. George, 1985) while others put none at all.
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considerable relevance under post-colonial conditions as well. One
version relied on the idea that industrial countries need an outlet
for excess production and the developing countries provide it.5
The "unequal exchange" ideas of Emmanuel (1972) and others, whereby
industrial centre countries have an advantage in the way they trade
with underdeveloped primary product exporters and thus reap nearly
all or even more than all of the gains from the trade falls in this
category. Some authors emphasize the cooptation of developing
country leaders, whereby they are induced by bribery or other
techniques to act in ways inconsistent with the interests of their
own countries but consistent with those of the industrial world.
The dependency school, as its name implies, emphasizes the possible
costs and disadvantages of being highly dependent on the industrial
countries.6 Even those economists who favour free trade would no
doubt be less positively inclined to the benefits of trade if
forced to analyze it in a clearly colonial context in which the
colonial power sets all the rules and may have little direct
interest in the welfare of the colony. But the combination of lack
of familiarity with the political process and a general
understanding that colonialism is in the past contributes to
economists' limited use of power in their formal analysis, which
instead  proceeds on the assumption that all outcomes reflect
initial resource endowments and that each actor freely chooses how
to use his/her factors of production and spend his/her income.
Recent focus on asymmetrical information has indeed moved some
analysis in the direction of opening the door for taking direct
account of power; the recent rise of institutional economics also
broadens the horizon, though much of its focus is on the economic
basis of institutions rather than on the implications of how they
function. 
Although political economists are on average less positive
about the impact of exports in general, including agricultural
ones, than are economists, some strands of their thinking may also
put this phenomenon in a positive light. Even Marxist theory can be
viewed in this light, since it essentially posits that the only way
up for a society is for the workers to first be subjugated and
exploited; later, after capitalism has raised productivity and the
revolution has led to a redistribution of the fruits of that8
productivity, the workers reap the benefits. Some of the developing
country histories alluded to below lend themselves to such an
interpretation, though the  ultimate redistribution towards the
workers may have had more Kuznetsian (Kuznets, 1955) or
Hirschmanian (Hirschman, 1958) than Marxist origins. Economies were
stagnant and even declining until exports came along; this led to
the poor being pushed aside, great wealth being created for the
few, and the economies getting on a growth path which takes them to
a point where the poor can start to beenfit. Possibly international
trade is the mechanism through which the necessary initial loss to
workers as capitalism takes hold can occur fastest and with as
little total loss to the poor as any other alternative. Though
there is no purely economic reason why the poor need to lose at all
as growth gets started, it could be the only politically feasible
route in quite a few countries.
A number of the arguments put forward are interesting for the
intuitions which they reflect. Critics of agricultural exports
sometimes note that the export of food when the population is
hungry (the case of late Czarist Russia is an example but there are
many others) highlights the fact that the country does not act like
a family in terms of mutual support. Others (like Emmanuel) focus
on "unequal exchange". Others are uncomfortable with the
economists' argument that cash crop exports will not occur in free
markets unless they make it possible to buy more food imports than
could have been produced at home. Some of the criticism seems to
reflect unfamiliarity with the basic ideas of comparative
advantage, and hence must be second-guessed, though the intuition
behind it might point to interesting aspects of the broader issues.
 Since historians look at the longer run with less initial
prejudices than either economists or political scientists, their
interpretations are clearly of interest as well.
4. The Empirical and Historical Record
While it is uncontroversial that the labour intensive
manufactured exports of Taiwan and other East Asian countries have
been good for the growth in those countries and may have been a
significant factor toward reductions in inequality, it is not clear
that there is any recorded case in which agricultural exports have
had this dual positive effect which in turn guarantees a strongly
poverty-alleviating effect. Unfortunately there is usually little
data on income distribution in those countries where agricultural
exports are still very important.
On the other hand the evidence that agricultural exports are
likely to contribute to a country's overall growth is more
persuasive. Some cross-country studies of the trade-growth link
distinguish agricultural from other exports and some do not; in any
case the general tenor of a large literature is that exports do
promote growth. The nature of these statistical exercises is such,
though, that they usually address only the narrow question of     7 Are the manufacturing goods prices measured well in this
regard, so that they do not suffer from upward biases due to
failure to deal well with quality change?
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whether a country where such exports are growing faster than
elsewhere will also enjoy faster GDP growth. One reason to expect
such a result relates to the fallacy of composition element of such
studies; if one country is benefitting a lot this may be coming
partly at the expense of other countries producing the same item
and losing market share, thus leaving it unclear whether all
producers as a group are gaining or not. The Prebisch-Singer
hypothesis, to the effect that aggregate LDC gains from primary
exports will be limited due to low demand elasticity--which is
likely to take the form of declining terms of trade for that
category, seems to be borne out for nonfuel primary products over
the course of this century; Grilli and Yang (1988) report that the
secular trend in terms of trade has moved against nonfuel primary
products (vis a vis manufactured ones) at a rate of about 0.5-0.7%
per year.7 Since primary goods terms of trade fluctuate widely this
result, which incorporates the sharp decline of 1978-82, contrasts
with studies undertaken in the late 1970s which tended to show no
clear long run trend. It is also true that within the average there
are very different trends according to the product, cotton and
rubber going down while beverages like coffee and cocoa have
appreciated considerably (Barham, et al, 1992, 59).
Still, such prominent analysts as W. Arthur Lewis have argued
that agricultural exports made major contributions to development
in many developing countries by pulling them out of stagnation onto
a growth path which they were able to maintain relatively well
thereafter. The great wave of globalization which characterized the
late 19th and early 20th centuries brought many developing
countries into closer contact and involvement in world markets than
had been the case before. Lewis (1978) refers to the period 1870-
1913 as the "golden age" of non-European growth; the rate of growth
of trade, mainly in primary commodities, from the tropics was
nearly as high as from the temperate countries of recent
settlement, and both almost equalled the rate of growth of trade of
the "core" industrial countries. That the standard of living was
much higher in the temperate countries than in the tropics and
increased over time relative to that in the latter (Lewis, 1978,
chaps. 7, 8; Bairoch, 1975) is attributed by Lewis to the
difference in agricultural productivity, which also continued to
increase. "The tropics were held back by their need for a
technological revolution in agriculture such as has been occurring
in Western Europe over two centuries" (Lewis, 1978, 202). At the
same time he concluded that this entry was the definitive turning
point which set many countries on a path of growth and development.
A significant debate in both the industrial and the developing10
countries has swirled around the question of the internal
distribution/employment effects of more open trade. For the
developing countries the Hecksher-Ohlin theory was reassuring--
since it suggested an increase in wages, but the events have tended
to contradict it. A major reconsideration of whether and how
globalization is contributing to the widespread observed increases
in inequality in the Third World is now ongoing, with particular
fervour in Latin America (Berry, 1997; Bulmer-Thomas, 1996;
Altimir, 1994). The impact on rural distribution and poverty has
been less analyzed than that for urban areas, since the data are
much sparser, but the presumption is that the experience there is
not the opposite of that for urban areas.
Though technical, static economic arguments may account for
some cases in which the opportunity to export agricultural goods is
prejudicial to the welfare of the rural poor, historically it
appears that the main channel to that outcome has involved their
displacement from the land they previously operated and the
conflict associated therewith, and the pressures to achieve the
rights over their labour services. In a word, when land and even
labour becomes more valuable, the politics around its control
changes to the benefit of the rich. A classic playing out of this
pattern is seen in the history of Northeastern Brazil, where the
export booms have been shown to coincide with worsening living
conditions of the workers and vice versa. When the profits from
exports were high, the hacendados limited the land and time the
workers could allocate to their own activities to a minimum, and
when those profits were low the workers had access to more
resources for their own use (Barraclough, Furtado, Denslow) with
each export boom the poor got worse off since the exporters took
the maximum rent which meant squeezing the poor down to a minimum
standard of living. Between those booms there was no point in doing
so.
When the benefits to be obtained from exports are modest, they
may not induce any conflict over the resources which produce them,
but when those beneftis are potentially large, sabres begin to
rattle. In country after country it has been the case that when
land becomes valuable enough, the powerful push the weak off what
land they had. Most often, though not always, what makes it
valuable is the opportunity to export a high value product. At this
point it will pay the rich to dispossess the poor of all of their
land even if they cannot use it all, in order to guarantee cheap
labour services by cutting the poor off from the option of
cultivating their own land. El Salvador's recent civil war can be
traced back to the evictions of the 19th century. The same goes for
Guatemala, Viet Nam, Brazil, Sudan and many others (Berry, 1998a).
5. A Political-Economy Model of Agricultural Exports and the
Welfare of the Rural Poor     8 Peasants, like everyone else, have a sense of what is
right and just. The intensity of their resistance to being pushed
off land and their long memories of such injustice reflect this.
Similarly, when the "equilibrium" product share of sharecroppers
falls they resist out of a parallel sense of "just price."
     9 At the theoretical extreme of full rights transfer a
worker would expend as much effort and do as good a job when
working for the powerful as for himself; since this appears
seldom to be the case, that extreme is correspondingly unlikely
to be approximated.
     10 In theory the expropriation could go from the rich to the
poor in cases where the poor are politically powerful. This is
most likely to be so under political democracy or something akin
to it. In the post-war  political structure of Japan it was
assumed that once a small farm agriculture was created it would
contribute to stable democracy. Unfortunately for the poor to
have political power through a non-violent political process,
they usually have to already be small farmers or productive
artisans. Usually this situation arises when the country is
already well along the development path so that it is
considerably less agricultural and the possible impacts of
agricultural exports correspondingly less important.
The model as discussed here is also oversimplified in
allowing only two groups, the poor/weak and the rich/powerful.
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Taking this aspect of the export-welfare relation into
account, one can define a spectrum in terms of the ease with which
the powerful can displace the poor from resources the latter
previously controlled when those resources take on increased value.
At one extreme is the static economic model in which resource
allocation is given and cannot be changed by the use of power. At
the other is the case where the rich and powerful can with zero
cost take any resources they want at any time; when the payoff to
some resources is not high enough the poor are allowed to use them.
Probably no developing country is ever really close to either end
of this spectrum; the use of power is always able to shift some
resources to the rich when their value increases; and the
resistance of the poor/weak is almost always enough so that takeing
resources from them has some "expropriation" costs.8 Not only
rights to land but also those to labour can be transferred, in the
latter case most directly by the institution of slavery or serfdom
and more indirectly in other ways.9  Expropriation costs will often
be substantially different as between land or other natural
resources and labour. The general question of interest is where on
this spectrum of overall expropriation costs a given case lies.10Usually there are important further distinctions within a
society; a middle class may be significant and/or there may be
cleavages within the rich/powerful group. Such cleavages often
provide some potential coalitions with the poor/weak. Sometimes
the state has a certain amount of independent power.
     11 The European "enclosures" were among the early examples
of this process. In England the great periods were the 15th-16th
centuries, when the purpose was to increase the amount of pasture
available for sheep (the wool trade was the driving force in the
process) and the 18th-19th centuries, when it was defended on the
grounds of increasing agricultural efficiency. When the common
land of the manor was divided up among landholders and fenced in,
the peasant farmers were evicted and they and the landless
labourers who depended for a major part of their subsistence on
the right to graze livestock did not share in the division and
many became paupers (Encyclopedia Britannica, Macropaedia, Vol. #
6, 1128).
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The costs to the poor of losing resources when their value
increases can be thought of as having two components; the value of
resources per se, and the costs of the struggle or transfer. For
the powerful the benefits are the gain in resources minus the costs
to them of the transfer. One might expect that there would be cases
in which the poor gain from export booms and cases where they lose
in this sort of model; in the former situations the basic economic
considerations are positive enough to offset any less of resources
and associated costs. Obviously the weighing off of benefits and
costs is harder than were these all in simple dollar terms; here
part of the costs of the conflict come in terms of insecurity, loss
of life, suffering, etc.
One can distinguish at least three broad classes of situation
or mechanism that can come into play to transfer resources to the
powerful or to increase the value of their resources relative to
that of the poor's. Straightforward use of power (force or threat
of force) is the simplest. It is most likely to occur with little
impediment (though varying cost to the poor) whenever the powerful
are not constrained either by the victims' capacity to resist or by
their own consciences or accepted rules. Land appropriation by the
drug barons provides good examples. Rumour has it that in a village
in northern Colombia whose peasants opted not to supply marijuana
to the drug bosses, the latter opted to send a clear signal to such
recalcitrants by lining up the residients and machine-gunning them.
More often the take-over is at least cloaked in a more legal guise,
which involves the state declaring communal property eliminated and
providing individual land deeds to its friends and collaborators.11
All societies have their "sharpies" who specialize in getting
income or wealth away from the less cunning by ruse, by deceit,     12 It is now the case that certain types of abuses related
to exports draw more attention than those related to domestic
production, which makes it hard to be sure just how central a
role the act of exporting plays in labour exploitation through
practices like child labour, unacceptable labour conditions, etc.
An example is the case of Persian rugs; such expropriation is
hard to root out--when they could no longer operate in Iran they
moved to Pakistan. Sometimes the international spotlight only




Less extreme again and more subtle are the many cases in which
for the land and labour resources of the weak to have full
potential value the state (sometimes at the national level,
sometimes local government or communities) must take complementary
action, in the form of investment in infrastructure (roads,
communication, R&D, etc.). By failing to do so it can keep the
value of the resource down and facilitate its purchase at low
prices, after which the provision of the relevant infrastructure
raises it. Or it can provide the infrastructure which is
complementary to large farms rather than to small ones. Mexico and
Bolivia are interesting examples of situations in which, even
though land reform broke some large farms into small ones which
went to the peasants, the governments then spent so little on this
reform sector that its productivity did not rise as much as it
could have, while investing heavily in other areas to the benefit
of a new agricultural elite. In Taiwan, by contrast, the Japanese
invested heavily in infrastructure which was consistent with a
small farm structure, probably simply because this was the most
efficient model to extract the rice they wanted.
Another reflection of power arises when the behaviour of the
powerful has negative externalities on the poor, even though they
may not lose any resources in a physical sense. Thus, shrimp
farming in Honduras damages the mangroves on which many thousands
of peasants depend for their living (Barham et al, 1992, 57).
Aerial spraying for pests in many countries damages crops on nearly
small farms when the spray drifts over their land.
While it does not have to be exports which trigger a forced
transfer of resources12, in most cases it will require a discrete
increase in potential value of those resources--enough to induce a
concerted effort to effect the transfer, which may require some
expenditure of resources and/or some political organization. Such
a quick increase in value is often associated with a new export
opportunity, which involves a large potential market. Whenever the
opportunity arises the pressure for expropriation by force or by
guile is evident. Where the benefits could in principal accrue
either to the powerful (large) or the weak (small) but capacity to     13 Described in detail by Lipton (   ).
     14 This has been a problem with Honduras winter vegetables;
excessive use of pesticides leads to increased pest resistance,
to the point where a crop has to be dropped. There is evidence of
serious illness problems related to pesticide use, for both
people and animals (Barham et al, 1989, 57). 
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respond quickly determines who will take charge of the resources
permanently, the powerful tend to win because their private
response can be organized quickly while that of the small scale
counterparts requires collective organization which may not be so
quick, and because frequently the state helps the strong but not
the weak.
In cases where the weak do get initial benefits from new
opportunities and do well economically for a period of time,
stronger or wilier ones are likely to try to appropriate such
benefits. When small farmers are doing well in an export chain, say
because of the labour intensity of a good, an effort will be made
to find a more capital intensive (or more generally cheaper) way of
doing it. In general the bias of technological change to save
labour is income concentrating.
The basic dilemma of small-scale agriculture and hence of the
rural poor comes when they require complementarity steps from the
state. Then they are at the mercy of the rich whenever a good
income opportunity comes along, unless there is some special factor
working in their favour--either political power per se, in highly
democratic societies, or some special defense against the
expropriation of their resources. Thus, in the small farm coffee
areas of Colombia, like the department of Caldas, the rich had a
lot of trouble getting to the area because of a most difficult
topography (e.g. requiring four weeks on mule back in some cases).
The large can invest themselves, see opportunities faster and
elicit state support much more effectively, so whenever change is
rapid and the rents are big enough to attract the attention of the
rich, there will be trouble. The cautious peasant13, whose
rationality has been honed over the long run, loses when the winds
of change are blowing fast. Comparative advantage in practice
depends on many institutional factors. There is usually an element
of "construction" to any country's revealed comparative advantage,
whether in agricultural or in other items.
Cash crops can have heavy environmental costs (Barham et al,
1992, 56).14 It may be that the larger firms will have the advantage
in responding to these externalities in a politically acceptable
way. Such response is likely to involve capacity to do things
quickly in an area involving considerable technical information and
in a way which is negotiated with national and international
authorities. Pesticide use can be a barrier to entry of the product     15 Not all land grabs are associated with exports. In Latin
America the subjugation of indigenous peoples and the very
unequal allocation of land created a domestically-focussed
latifundia-minifundia system and laid the foundations for a
number of uprisings during the colonial period i.e. prior to the
early 19th century.
     16 In El Salvador the process of peasant displacement
occurred mainly in the 19th century. After pushing the indigenous
communities off their communal property, the coffee oligarchy
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into developed country markets (as with Guatemala vegetables in the
U.S. market- see Carter et al, 1996, 43).
   The economic and political factors mentioned above can all
influence the overall impact of agricultural export activities on
the rural poor. In order to better understand and predict that
impact in specific situations, it would be desirable to identify
likely interactions between the economic and the political factors,
for example along the lines of those who relate the socio-economic
system surrounding he production of a given crop to the technology
involved in its production (e.g. Paige, 1975). Such identification
is, for the most part, beyond the scope of this paper.
6. Illustrations of the Use of Power
 From about 1850 on, agricultural produce became a major
source of export earnings in Latin America and other parts of the
world, and the growth of production for export profoundly affected
land tenure and social relations in the countryside.15 In some cases
landlords were able to create a dependent labour force by
pressuring the peasants off their land. In others overt conflicts
occurred. One major form of conflict occurred when large commercial
estates were created in areas of already dense Indian settlements;
this was the origin of the great sugar haciendas in Morelos,
Mexico, the coffee fincas set up in Guatemala and El Salvador and
the sheep ranches in Peru and Bolivia (Legrand, 1986, xiii).
Despite their sometimes strong resistance, the peasants usually
lost these conflicts (Pearse, 1975; Browning, 1971). Often, too,
major outbursts came later, as in the case of several Central
American, with those of El Salvador and Guatemala the most
dramatic--El Salvador's recently ended 12 year civil war claimed
about 75,000 lives while four decades of armed conflict in
Guatemala have killed about 100,000 (Pastor and Boyce, 1998, 4).
In all of the Central American experiences the roots of rural
violence lay in the displacement of populations when new export
opportunities in the 19th or 20th centuries made their lands become
valuable to groups with political power.16 More extreme, the exportoften had to deploy military force to maintain rural law and
order and to suppress intermittent peasant revolts, the most
serious of which occurred in 1932 when the Great Depression
reduced coffee prices and the employers cut wages and employment;
10-30 thousand people died in the massacre which followed (Pastor
and Boyce, 1998, 6). In Brazil the expansion of the coffee
frontier with its large farms was accompanied also by the
expropriation of settlers who were pushed onto public lands
farther out on the frontier (Legrand, 1986, 88). The Colombian
case is referred to below.
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interests often found it necessary to restrict the peasants' access
to other land and to use force to control the labour supply. Low
population density implied easy access to land on the part of the
population, and it became an article of faith of both the coffee
industry of the region and the colonial and republican
administrations that "no one would work for wages as hired labour
unless he or she was compelled." It seemed never to be contemplated
that more labour might be forthcoming if the wage were higher
(Bulmer-Thomas, 1987, 11). Governments which responded to the
export interests, as most did, tended to be confrontational with
labour. Most of these countries suffered "reactionary despotism,"
which generally received help from the outside, as in the cases of
the U.S. interventions to put down the Sandinista uprising of 1932
in Nicaragua and to block the Arbenz agrarian reform of 1954 in
Guatemala (Berry, 1998a). In the wave of peasant displacement which
occurred in Central America after WWII as cotton and beef exports
grew quickly in Guatemala, Nicaragua and other countries of the
region, road construction financed by the international agencies in
the 1950s and 1960s was a key facilitator; provision of U.S. beef
import quotas to Central America, assuring it of a favourable
position in the market, also helped to "construct" this comparative
advantage. Large amounts of capital (some of it from credit) were
necessary to get going--especially in cattle where it was necessary
to establish a herd of the new breed appropriate for export; it was
made available through private and state development banks, but
only to those with sufficient collateral. Even where squatters were
not evicted by the largeholders, the fact that cattle roam and
destroy crops would often have the same effect.
  Mexico's experience has much in common with that of Central 
America. Between 1880 and 1910 there was a sweeping consolidation
of rural holdings  which "detached an ever-increasing number of
peasants from the land and created a new class of agricultural wage
laborers" (Reynolds, 1970, 136). The previous combination of
haciendas and small subsistence plots held by indians or mestizos,
together with the "innately lazy and unproductive" Mexican peasant
himself, were held jointly responsible for the backwardness of     17 The size of the great haciendas which emerged from this
process was enormous. Some were over a million acres (Cumberland,
1968, 203). In several states three or four haciendas owned a
quarter or a third of all the land.
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agriculture in the country. Accordingly, the government supported
this enclosure movement, "in which federal land and peasant
communal holdings, as well as other private properties with clouded
titles, were redistributed to private land development companies
and to individuals successful in gaining favour with the
administration" (Reynolds, 1970, 137). The enclosure system
deprived the peasants of their security and economic independence.
Peasant displacement was by no means due exclusively to the
existence of export market opportunities, though here too there was
a symbiosis between the two. Though the hacendados17 typically left
considerable land fallow and were little given to searching for
productivity-increasing technological improvements, they did direct
their output increasingly to export markets, putting "the nation's
submerged classes on the ragged edge of starvation for the first
time since the middle of the colonial period" (Cumberland, 1968,
204). Production of foods declined even as the population expanded.
The social pressures built up during this process led to the
Mexican Revolution of the early 20th century which, though it led
eventually to the partial restoration of land to the previously
dispossessed, also caused enormous suffering by the rural poor (and
others) in Mexico and may have cost as many as two million lives
(Cumberland, 1968, 241).
Twentieth century Viet Nam provides another example of the
expulsion and exploitation of long-established peasant populations
to the end of achieving agricultural exports. Beginning in mid-19th
century rice was turned into a major export commodity, through the
creation of a class of large landholders (French and Vietnamese)
who could produce substantial surpluses. Some of the land they got
was newly colonized; the rest came from the displacement of
peasants. Land distribution became extremely unequal, nationalist
and socialist parties began to spring up after 1900, World War II
created an opening for resistance and the eventual outcome was the
Viet Nam War.
In other contexts export opportunities lead not so much to the
displacement of the poor from lands they previously occupied as to
conflicts with the powerful over previously unused land. In such
cases the outcome is less obviously to their disadvantage; if they
are able to acquire some of the new properties, and get work on
some of those owned by the new rich they could easily be better
off. Whether this is true overall, however, depends on the level of
insecurity and violence associated with the whole process. Where a
frontier is still being contested conflict arises easily. Much18
experience over long periods of time fits this category as
settlement has moved into previously thinly populated lowlands and
into jungle areas. Some of the expansion has involved production
for the domestic market, and some for export. But expanding
international demand has the economic force to quickly give what
were often "waste" lands an economic value; in such cases the
conflict between peasant settlers and land entrepreneurs is likely
to be particularly intense. In Colombia growing conflicts over
public land eventually compelled the government to intervene to
clarify the legal definition of private property (Legrand, 1986,
xvii). Its eventual support, at least de facto, for the landlords
was one of the key contributing factors for the escalation of rural
violence which broke out a decade later, extended over the two
decades and left 200,000 dead and 800,000 homeless (Oquist, 1980).
Legrand (1986, 170) concludes that although the colonos lost out in
most cases, "Colombian frontier expansion gave rise to an ideology
of peasant protest centred on the reclamation of public lands that
remains a vital tradition in the rural areas today."
 The Sudan's Mechanised Farming Project of 1968, designed to
increase the country's exports of cotton (the main export item)
pushed cultivators off the land and drove out pastoral nomads, then
turned the land over to large scale operations which created
relatively few jobs and channelled the gains to a new agricultural
elite. 
7. The Current Scenario: Has the World Changed and if so in What
Direction?
How should one characterize the current process of
agricultural export expansion? It is impossible to generalize or
take a balance at this point, since in many cases it is not clear
in what degree small-holders and hired labourers are participating
in the new growth, and in general the empirical evidence on rural
or agricultural income distribution and its changes is very scanty,
especially in the sorts of countries (many in Africa) where such
exports are quite important. At this point perhaps all that can be
said is that (i) the physical displacement of peasants which
occurred frequently in the past (perhaps most commonly and
notoriously in Latin America in the 19th century and the first part
of this one) is still present in some countries; one might guess
that it will be less frequent as lands open to settlement become
scarcer and rights more clearly defined, though there is still
considerable potential for it in Sub-Saharan Africa (ii) the
advantage of large operators in getting better support from the
government frequently remains striking; Kydd (1988, 1686)
demonstrates that the growth of the estate sector in Malawi
depended on the supply of labour from the increasingly impoverished
smallholder sector, which in turn was the result of government     18 In some countries (Pakistan is one) bureaucratic red tape
discourages some potential fruit/vegetable exports. Such
impediments usually weigh more heavily on small-scale
participants.
     19 Certain export root crops require up to 4000 work-days
per hectare while corn requires just 60 (UNCTAD, 1995, 25). A
considerably higher share of income can accrue to the poor than
for traditional export crops--Fox, Swanberg and Mehne (1994, 27)
estimate that the share of farmgate prices going to the bottom
quartile has reached above 60% for some vegetable crops as
opposed to below 25% for traditional export crops. Much of the
work is done by women; for example in Africa where they have
often been associated historically with vegetable production they
shift easily into the export of these products (Little, 1995, 29)
though often most of the income still tends to go to the males
when they own the land or the input systems are directed at them.
Generally the situation of women is better in processing than in
cultivation; that income, earned away from the farm, helps
empower them in their relations with their husbands and fathers,
as well as improve their subordinated role in rural social
structures (Glover and Fusterer, 1990, 137). 
     20 Rama's (1985) survey of agribusiness indicates that in
many instances governments have tried to improve conditions for
the small producers.
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policy (or lack thereof) toward this sector18; but (iii) the
phenomenon of contract farming, in which small producers sell
labour-intensive products (especially vegetables and fruits) to
larger companies gives promise of considerable job creation19; and
(iv) there is increasing recognition that it is important to create
income earning opportunities for the poor and there are now
numerous cases in which smallholders do get support from
governments and international agencies--many of them related to
contract farming.20 Whether the weak have on balance better defense
against being marginalized and more positive advantages than before
remains to be seen. Certainly there are sources of optimism, some
in the more political domain and some related to the pattern of
change within the purely economic determinants of the impacts of
agricultural exports.
The majority of the relevant literature suggests a negative
association between cash cropping and income distribution,
identifying uneven adoption of varietal and other improvements by
farm size (following the literature on the Green revolution) as one
cause of this outcome, and placing part of the blame on government
policy. This view could be too pessimistic; adoption of Green
Revolution varieties ultimately turned out to be much less uneven20
than had been at first feared. A second concern is that expansion
of export crops diminishes the output of food and can as a result
raise food prices. Von Braun and Kennedy (1986, 2) conclude from
their longitudinal analysis that the two are not competitive, since
they find that "most countries either manage a combination of
growth in both cash cropping and food production or fail to manage
either", with appropriate agricultural policies being the secret of
success. Cash crops can be important to food production if imported
inputs are important, as Sharpley (1988) has argued for Kenya, and
there are other elements of complementarity. But this issue must be
considered unsettled, with the outcome likely to vary from country
to country. 
In any case, selected examples make it clear that a negative
distributional effect is not inevitable. Chaiken (1983) describes
the successful development of a frontier community in the
Philippines, based on cash and food cropping and off-farm labour,
stressing the importance of kinship ties in providing support and
reducing inequalities. Fiji defended its small scale sugar industry
(Ellis, 1988) through a combination of tenurial arrangements,
contract terms, grower participation and a ban on harvesting
equipment.
Carter et al. (1996) emphasize the range of possible impacts
of agricultural exports. Since in each of three cases studied
(Paraguay--which  stands out for its agricultural-export-led growth
of recent decades, Chile and Guatemala) the amount of labour
absorbed in the boom crop decreases as the size of the farm
operation grows, so it is clear that unless small operators are
involved, both labour and non-labour income going to the poor will
be less. They observe: 
"The social welfare impacts of the export booms thus depend in
the short run on which classes adopt the crops: in the longer run,
these impacts depend on the patterns of structural change that
shift land between classes (and secondarily, alter  levels of
employment). If adoption of export crops favors smallholders, as it
has in the Guatemalan highlands, then the positive impacts on the
rural poor will tend to be magnified, and more and more so over
time if the boom renders smallholders more competitive in the land
market." 
"In the frontier region of Paraguay, the boom in wheat has
given rise to precisely the opposite interaction. The boom, which
directly favors large-scale farmers who absorb relatively little
labor per hectare, has occasioned a pattern of structural change
over time in which the shift of land to large farms has accentuated
the negative impacts of the boom on the rural poor, creating a
highly exclusionary growth trajectory that leaves peasants out as
both producers and workers." 
"The Chilean experience falls somewhere in between these two
cases. The fruit export boom has bypassed the traditional
minifundia sector and the small-scale farm sector created from the21
remnants of the agrarian reform. Over time, land has shifted from
smallholders to larger holdings. At the same time, export crops on
large farms seem to absorb more labour than the traditional crops
(and farms) that they displace. The effects on social welfare of
this partly exclusionary process have probably been aggravated by
the restructuring of the workforce toward more seasonal labor."
(Carter et al, 1996, 57-58).
The best crop for the rural poor would be one that they could
adopt on most of their land and grow competitively with larger
farmers. None of the above examples fully fit this model; in all
three cases crop characteristics worked against the small farmers
one way or another. The contract-farming regime for vegetable
exports from the highlands of Guatemala appeared to be the
competitively dominant mode but, according to Carter et al (1996,
43) its dominance is proving to be short-lived. Exporters have
begun to abandon it because of increasing costs associated with
quality measurement, in particular problems with pesticide residues
which have been threatening entry into the U.S. market. Intense
supervision of smallholders' pesticide use appears infeasible
because of the costs of monitoring. In the Chilean case economies
of scale (e.g. in production and packaging) were an impediment to
small producers. Exporter credit was available but most
smallholders and parceleros were not able to obtain loans. 
The general thrust of many, perhaps most, agro-export
strategies has been to emphasize labour intensive crops. Where
labour interactivity is high (where quantity and/or quality can be
raised by workers making careful choices during the production
process) small farmers can have the advantage. But "on the whole,
more competitive biases seem to be working against small-scale
producers than working for them."  "Larger farms are often favoured
by the human capital intensity of many export crops, product
perishability and the resulting need for vertical integration, and
the absence of insurance markets"....."small scale producers seem
to be favoured only by labour interactivity, highly fragmented
holdings that make land consolidation costly and (where they exist_
contractual relations and cooperative institutions that reduce some
of the other biases" (Carter et al, 1996, 58). These authors
conclude that "informed pessimism" is in order.
In each of these cases land distribution appears to have
become increasingly concentrated. In Paraguay, land holding has
long been highly unequal, large landowners traditionally tolerated
widespread squatting on areas not being used, often a major
proportion of their holdings (Carter, Barham and Mesbah, 1996, 54).
There was also an official colonization policy to distribute state-
owned land usually in remote parts of the interior. But since the
1960s land has become much more scarce, pushing up its price and
making it less affordable by the poorer farm families; meanwhile
evictions of new squatters are more common than before. In strife-
torn Guatemala a similar process has been occurring during much of     21 These items constitute the bulk of what are sometimes
referred to as nontraditional agricultural exports. Whether fresh
or processed, they have the potential to create a great deal of
employment per unit of sales.
     22 Under the Uruguay round tariffs on fruits and vegetables
were scheduled to decline by 28% in the EU, 39% in the USA and
33% in Japan (Barham et al, 1992, 16). Though on the exports from
LDCs the cuts will be less than on those applied to products
mainly traded among developed countries.
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the post War period and continues at least in some regions (Pape,
1997). Chile has seen a marked increase in the concentration of
landholding over the last 20 years, firstly as a direct result of
the partial undoing of the earlier land reforms of the Frei and
Allende administrations, and secondly through what is probably a
combination of purely economic forces (some of the exports are
capital intensive, making it hard for small-holders to participate)
plus a bias on the part of complementing infrastructure.
The New Smallholder Exports: Contract Farming
Although the time path of the terms of trade for agricultural
exports as a group is not encouraging nor are the distributional
impacts of a number of exports, the demand elasticity for a quite
labour intensive category of such products, fruits and vegetables21,
and the rapid growth of trade in this area gives grounds for hope.22
With it has come a new wave of contract farming on a large scale,
creating the hope of not just a large increase in demand for labour
but also in farm business income. These non-traditional exports
also create the possibility of diversification at the farm level,
by involvement in the related processing and trade activities, thus
augmenting the working opportunities and incomes of the rural poor.
Is contract farming the modern-day equivalent to the development of
small farm exports of coffee, tea, cocoa and other crops at earlier
times? Or is it the equivalent of subcontracting in manufacturing
export processes?
Contract farming has been heavily promoted in quite a few
countries since at least the 1970s and there is now a proliferation
of such schemes around the LDCs, some totally private, others with
government involvement. Export activity has been based on both
formal and informal marketing arrangements, the latter consisting
of exports through family or ethnically-related agents of firm-
owners abroad. Formal arrangements typically consist of foreign
owned affiliates and joint venture undertakings that have arms-
length contracts with manufacturing and distribution companies
abroad; they are most common in food products, where the processing
plants have high fixed costs which give them high incentive to keep     23 Fox, Swanberg and Mehen (1994) describe the non-
traditional exporters guild of Guatemala. Glover (1987, 444)
notes that growers' organizations can help with the communication
between the contractor and the large number of small producers.
Some companies will not go into an area unless an organization
exists. Sometimes, however, the local government is wary of such
organizations and discourages them.
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a steady flow of products coming in. Contract farming provides a
number of benefits to the grower, relieving him of responsibility
on the technical front, cutting risk of low prices, and improving
credit access (Glover, 1987, 441).
Smallholders often comprise the pyramid base of vertically
integrated systems of non-traditional agro-export production,
processing and marketing. Contract farming arrangements involving
a thousand smallholders or more are not uncommon. Sometimes such
arrangements are the result of political and social as well as
economic considerations. In Ghana where most of the land
surrounding pineapple plantations is still under indigenous tenure
system, estates must usually utilize outgrowers in order to expand
exports. National development policy has ensured that the farming
be done by small holders in the case of Sri Lanka also (USAID,
1994, p.viii). In the Gambia, on the other hand, the government has
intervened to award large concessions to big firms so that the
importance of the smallholders in horticultural exports has
decreased since the late 1980s (Little, 1995). Sometimes
transnationals have used outgrowers as an alternative to or in
addition to plantation-style agriculture when fearful of land
expropriations and militant labour strikes (Little, 1995).
Sometimes they contract in order diversify spatially to reduce the
risk of supply failure. In Kenya the green beans operation between
a French company and a private Kenyan company relies on raw
material supplies from some 20,000 resource poor smallholders in
Western Kenya (Jaffee, 1992, 75). The former moved from own
production to contract farming to avoid the supervision costs
associated with producing high quality vegetables with a large
wage-labour force (von Braun et al, 1989). Its presence had a
demonstration effect as a number of domestic producers established
processing plants and export networks. Incorporation of
smallholders has often been facilitated by the physical
infrastructure and institutional support provided by governments,
as in the case of Lam Nam Oon in Thailand (Dolinski, 1992). Local
representative farmer organizations such as cooperatives have
sometimes played an important role in making smallholders
competitive with larger farmers (Kumar, Lieberson and Miller, 1994,
20-21, cited by UNCTAD, 1995, 23). Such associations help bring
together the producers with importers through trade fairs,
information on external markets and technologies etc.23 Federations24
of smallholders have sometimes gone as far as carrying out research
to improve the quality of farmers' products, as with the guava
paste association in Colombia (Duran, 1995). Alternative Trade
Organizations (ATOs) have helped raise smallholders incomes in some
cases by training them in storage, processing and marketing,
thereby taking over some of the functions of contractors and
increasing members' incomes accordingly (Coote, 1992; Tiffen,
1995).
The agribusinesses which opt for plantation forms of
production or contractual arrangements with just a few large
producers are often associated with foreign direct investment and
tend to have a high level of vertical integration. But processing
of non-traditional exports does not have to be on a large scale as
witness the guava paste case in Colombia. Usually it is not a
matter of doing everything on a large or small scale, so companies
often subcontract the labour intensive parts of the work and do the
rest in-house. Flexibility of smallholder production is valued to
deal with demand swings (Jaffee, 1994).
Authors like Glover have cautioned against the optimistic view
of contract farming as a new, simple model for agricultural
development. The conflicting goals of raising exports, keeping
profits up and benefitting the peasants may conflict. Various
problems can arise for the small farmers, including manipulation by
the contractor, favouritism for preferred growers through date
allocations, bribes of field inspectors, poor technical assistance,
late payments, etc. Where individual growers are dissatisfied a
common response is to form a growers association; when producers
are heterogenous in size etc. this can be hard, and in the extreme
absentee growers may be fronting for the company (Glover, 1987,
444). Even governments which would like to help the rural poor may
be constrained by the perceived need to milk the agriculture sector
for quick foreign exchange benefits.
The overall contribution of the new agricultural exports, and
within that category of contract farming, to poverty alleviation in
rural areas will depend on the magnitude of such export growth and
on the benefits to the rural poor per dollar of sales. On the
former count it seems likely that the impact can be substantial in
small countries located near large industrial country markets--the
Central American countries are the most obvious example, but
markedly less significant in large LDCs. In Sub-Saharan Africa non-
traditional agro-exports were by the 1990s third in value behind
coffee and cocoa but ahead of tea, cotton and tobacco (UNCTAD,
1995, 15) and their share has risen rapidly in a number of these
countries. Smallholder contract farming is also quite common in
Guatemala--accounting for US$80 millions of exports in 1992. The
main overall evidence comes from the rate of increase in these
types of exports from developing countries at a world level. For
the two regions most likely to benefit substantially, Africa and
Latin America, the data are somewhat but not highly encouraging.     24 Goldsmith's (1985) review of 12 case studies reports a
significant positive impact on rural incomes in almost every
case, though most indicated uneven impact among the program
participants. 
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For the particularly relevant category "vegetables, fresh and
preserved" (of which a large majority are in the "fresh" category),
there has indeed been rapid growth of exports from both of these
regions, a tripling over 1985-95 (Table 1). But even with this
rapid growth, these exports only account for 1% (Africa) and 1.5%
(Latin America) of all exports as of 1995. The two regions together
have maintained but not increased their share of world trade at
about 11% over that decade. The early 1990s were a period of
especially strong growth, however, and an optimistic projection of
that trajectory would undoubtedly create interesting possibilities
for smallholder output and employment. But the total effect would
not be large unless the market continued to grow fast for a rather
lengthy period. As for fruit (less relevant since on average less
characterized by smallholder production), this category has
declined in share of total exports for both regions, as their
combined share of world trade plummeted from nearly half to under
a quarter. The data do imply that these categories are becoming a
more important component of non-fuel primary exports (essentially
agricultural products), since the share of that broader category in
total exports has been falling systematically--from 46% to 32% in
Africa between 1970 and 1992  and from 45% to 30% in Latin
America/Caribbean (World Bank, 1994, 191). Vegetable and fruit
exports as a share of GDP fell in Africa from 9.7% to 8.3% and for
Latin America from 5.9% to 4.8% over this period.
As for the distribution of the gains from nontraditional
agricultural exports, the evidence is generally encouraging for
smallholder contract farming, in spite of the inevitable
exceptions, and of the fact that benefits will not necessarily
accrue to the poorest in any given region or in the world,
reasonably so for other types of contract farming (where labour
intensity can be high but is not always) and less than reassuring
for other nontraditional export channels--partly because too little
organized evidence is available. In cases of contract farming high
labour intensity itself is a positive sign. Direct evidence on the
distribution of gains reflects the fact that the share accruing to
the large companies involved (e.g. MNCs which undertake contract
farming) varies widely.24 Broccoli and other winter vegetable
production in Guatemala occurs mainly on small farms and the
distributional impact of such production appears to be positive.
The evidence from one region--Cuatro Pinos, revealed that members
continue to grow corn on a majority of their land (50-60% vs 80%     25 Interesting as they are as tests of the contract farm
model, it must be remembered that small countries like Guatemala
are special cases in several important respects. As in Costa
Rica, the promotion of nontraditional exports has been an
integral part of U.S. assistance policy since the mid-1980s; the
Caribbean Basin Initiative provisions gave free market access to
a wide range of new agricultural products.
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for the control group of non participants) but nonetheless they
produced more corn per hectare of farmland, perhaps because of
better access to fertilizers, the nitrogen-fixing feature of snow
peas or better cultivation practices. This case illustrates the
fact that the effect of exports on food production can be positive,
at least when the land remains in the hands of smallholders.25 The
conditions surrounding Central American melons suggest that the
companies will reap much of the benefit (Barham et al, 1992, 60).
In Costa Rica, the first Central American country to respond to the
crisis of the 1980s by launching an export drive, the leading firms
have been mainly foreign, and there does not appear to have been
much participation by small farmers; in spite of the country's
history of a strong cooperative movement, cooperatives and small
farmers export only a tiny portion of the new items. Barham et al
(1992, 70) attribute this outcome in part to lack of government and
AID interest in promoting their participation. In spite of the
range of situations observed, it seems likely that, if the demand
for the sorts of products handled by contract farming is
sufficiently price and income elastic so that their total value
continues to increase rapidly, they will paly a significant
positive role in raising the incomes of relatively poor rural
people in the developing world. In other words, it seems less
likely that the other possible problems cited would be the reason
why this type of export might not make a significant dent on rural
poverty.
Average distributional outcomes are probably less promising
when nontraditional agricultural exports do not take the contract
farming route. Chile's fruit boom has led to the creation of a new
agrarian bourgeoisie, which includes urban industrialists and
professionals (e.g. agronomists and MBAs), foreign investors
including MNCs, and some of the previous landholding families also
(Rodriguez and Vanegas, 1989). Education has been important to
getting in and access to capital has been central. Although medium
sized farms play an important role in the production of some
nontraditional exports in Chile, in general the tendency has been
toward concentration and multinationalization. Nonetheless there
has been quite an increase in demand for labour, much of it
seasonal; many urban residents, including unemployed household
heads and youth, have participated. And there is some evidence that
wages in fruiticulture have begun to rise. Paraguay's exclusionary27
experience with nontraditional exports has been noted above.
The balance sheet on the various forces at work can be finally
judged only by the overall outcomes, even though data on the
changes in exports by product, the employment related to each and
so on is helpful as well. The information on income and welfare
distribution and changes in the status of people in rural areas is
still too partial to provide much of a test thus far. With time the
evidence will become more conclusive. 
8.The Prospects
When smallholders do participate extensively in exports the
effects can clearly be quite positive. The secret is to make sure
that this happens. Whenever the agricultural exports in question
are sufficiently labour intensive or are produced by smallholders
(or both) then the result should be positive. The question is how
often and under what circumstances this outcome will emerge. The
situation in agriculture is in many respects parallel to that in
non-agriculture, especially manufacturing. Trade expansion is
likely to have a positive effect on employment and on the income of
the poor when smaller enterprises are tied directly or indirectly
into exports, and this normally happens hen the technology is
labour intensive; otherwise the outcome may be the opposite (Berry,
1998b).
It is clear that policy matters greatly to the impact of
agricultural trade expansion. Though market forces alone will pull
some small producers of labour intensive items into export
activities and keep them there, it is likely that in many other
cases this will happen only when appropriate complementary
investments are undertaken, impeding red-tape removed, etc. One of
the barriers to success may lie precisely in the fact that exports,
regardless of how carried out, are viewed by some as the answer to
everything; this view pulls countries into the "new gimmick"
syndrome which has often been so negative in the past because it
detracts from the idea that it is necessary to work on many fronts.
The strongly ideological attachment many economists have to freer
trade and more open markets is dangerous in that it may lead to an
overestimate (partly needed for political purposes) of the relative
role that this policy area can play. Agricultural exports may
indeed be the best recipe for poverty if the right people do them
but a disaster if the approach is laisser faire, in which anything
goes, including land grabs and control of public policy by the
rich. One of the tricky aspects in steering a good course in this
policy area lies in the fact that clear signals of what is
profitable are needed to induce people and investment into an
activity. But the same signals can also induce theft, takeover of
public policy and marginalization of the weak. What institutions
and can help a country to achieve the former effect while
minimizing the latter?28
Thus far, nontraditional agricultural exports have been
important primarily in Africa and parts of Latin America. This fact
rises two concerns. First, if this model is not relevant to Asia,
and especially to South Asia, its potential impact at the world
level is greatly reduced thereby. Second, it is in Africa that
ambiguous and changing patterns of land rights, together with
sometimes heavy-handed governments, create the greatest risk of the
drive for exports leading to losses by the smaller, weaker members
of rural society. The idea that large farms are likely to be more
efficient than small ones remains common here, as in some of other
parts of the world, and the attractiveness of distribution of land
in large units to political allies is a natural incentive to favour
them See the other paper and Norma etc.
It should be noted that the above discussion essentially
abstracts from the subtler questions related to benefits and costs
of a more outward oriented economic strategy, including such issues
raised by the dependency school as the transfer of industrial
country tastes to the developing countries (George, 1985).29
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Table 1
Exports of Fruits and Vegetables: Absolute Values and Share of
Total Exports; Developing Countries of Latin and Central America
and of Africa
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
    1985 1990 1995
Africa (developing)   
  Total Exports    62,023          77,891        76,076 
  Vegeatables                  200             326           607
(fresh and 
simply preserved)
  Vegetables                    74             143           196
(preserved and
prepared)
  Veg./total                  0.44            0.60          1.05
  Fruit, fresh/dried     1,367   1,184     1,508
  Fruit, preserved/prepared    213             319  394
  Fruit/total 2.55            1.93      2.50 
  Veg & fruit/total           2.99       2.53      3.55
Latin America*  
  Total                     87,536         117,686       182,305
  Vegetables      696           1,373         2,440
(fresh and 
simply preserved)
  Vegetables   89             165           309
(preserved and
prepared)
  Veg./total                  0.90            1.31          1.51
  Fruit, fresh/dried     4,148    3,843     4,938
  Fruit, preserved/prepared    966           2,000     2,050
  Fruit/total 5.84            4.96      3.83 
  Veg & fruit/total           6.74            6.27      5.34
World
  Vegetables**               9,401          19,593    30,372 
  Arica (developing)
   and Latin America*/world 11.3            10.2          11.7
  Fruits***                 14,205          27,954        39,428
  Arica (developing)
   and Latin America*/world 47.1            26.3          22.6
* Including Central America, south America and Mexico. 
** Includes both "fresh and simply preserved" and "preserved and
prepared".
*** Includes both "fresh/dried" and "preserved/prepared."   35
Source: United Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook,
selected years.36
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